Search for: All records

This paper investigates countermeasures to side-channel attacks. A dynamic partial reconfiguration (DPR) method is proposed for field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs)s to make techniques such as differential power analysis (DPA) and correlation power analysis (CPA) difficult and ineffective. We call the technique side-channel power resistance for encryption algorithms using DPR, or SPREAD. SPREAD is designed to reduce cryptographic key related signal correlations in power supply transients by changing components of the hardware implementation on-the-fly using DPR. Replicated primitives within the advanced encryption standard (AES) algorithm, in particular, the substitution-box (SBOX)s, are synthesized to multiple and distinct gate-level implementations. The different implementations change the delay characteristics of the SBOXs, reducing correlations in the power traces, which, in turn, increases the difficulty of side-channel attacks. The effectiveness of the proposed countermeasures depends greatly on this principle; therefore, the focus of this paper is on the evaluation of implementation diversity techniques. 

This paper investigates countermeasures to side-channel attacks. A dynamic partial reconfiguration (DPR) method is proposed for field programmable gate arrays (FPGAs)s to make techniques such as differential power analysis (DPA) and correlation power analysis (CPA) difficult and ineffective. We call the technique side-channel power resistance for encryption algorithms using DPR, or SPREAD. SPREAD is designed to reduce cryptographic key related signal correlations in power supply transients by changing components of the hardware implementation on-the-fly using DPR. Replicated primitives within the advanced encryption standard (AES) algorithm, in particular, the substitution-box (SBOX)s, are synthesized to multiple and distinct gate-level implementations. The different implementations change the delay characteristics of the SBOXs, reducing correlations in the power traces, which, in turn, increases the difficulty of side-channel attacks. The effectiveness of the proposed countermeasures depends greatly on this principle; therefore, the focus of this paper is on the evaluation of implementation diversity techniques. 

Abstract Engineering synthetic interfaces between membranes has potential applications in designing non‐native cellular communication pathways and creating synthetic tissues. Here, InterSpy is introduced as a synthetic biology tool consisting of a heterodimeric protein engineered to form and maintain membrane–membrane interfaces between apposing synthetic as well as cell membranes through the SpyTag/SpyCatcher interaction. The inclusion of split fluorescent protein fragments in InterSpy allows tracking of the formation of a membrane–membrane interface and reconstitution of functional fluorescent protein in the space between apposing membranes. First, InterSpy is demonstrated by testing split protein designs using a mammalian cell‐free expression (CFE) system. By utilizing co‐translational helix insertion, cell‐free synthesized InterSpy fragments are incorporated into the membrane of liposomes and supported lipid bilayers with the desired topology. Functional reconstitution of split fluorescent protein between the membranes is strictly dependent on SpyTag/SpyCatcher. Finally, InterSpy is demonstrated in mammalian cells by detecting fluorescence reconstitution of split protein at the membrane–membrane interface between two cells each expressing a component of InterSpy. InterSpy demonstrates the power of CFE systems in the functional reconstitution of synthetic membrane interfaces via proximity‐inducing proteins. This technology may also prove useful where cell‐cell contacts and communication are recreated in a controlled manner using minimal components.